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What Context? A Critique of Time Warner
Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc.
Matt Bahl*
I. INTRODUCTION
Jessica Simpson and William Shatner are generally not thought of as
controversial characters. However, when DIRECTV used these two stars for
commercials in its recent "SOURCE MA'ITERS" campaign, the effect was
certainly controversial.' The present case addresses the validity of an inter-
locutory judgment made by the district court on the basis that the above com-
mercials, as well as online advertisements, constituted violations of the
Lanham Act's false advertising doctrine.2 Specifically, the court provided
three distinct holdings regarding aspects of the false advertising doctrine. 3 In
providing clarification, the court stated:
First . ..an advertisement can be literally false even though it
does not explicitly make a false assertion, if the words or images,
considered in context, necessarily and unambiguously imply a
false message. Second ... the category of non-actionable "puff-
ery" encompasses visual depictions that, while factually inaccu-
rate, are so grossly exaggerated that no reasonable consumer
would rely on them in navigating the marketplace.4
The court ultimately adopted the "false by necessary implication" doctrine,
which requires courts to consider words or images in full context to deter-
mine whether the advertisement is, in fact, false or misleading.5 The court,
however, overlooked and oversimplified the web-based advertisement by rul-
ing it was mere puffery.6 In doing so, the court not only failed to heed its
A May 2009 candidate for Juris Doctor candidate at Southern Methodist Uni-
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1. See Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d 299, 303
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
2. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2007)
(finding that the advertisements violated the Lanham Act on literal falsity
grounds).
3. Id. This note is concerned only with the court's first two holdings.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 158 (citing Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 274 (4th Cir.
2002); Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 34-
35 (lst Cir. 2000); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134,
1139 (9th Cir. 1997); Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 946-47 (3d
Cir. 1993)).
6. See id. at 160.
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own previous intimations, but it also does not consider the full context of the
web-based advertisement. Instead, the court seemed to adopt two standards
for reviewing advertisements: one standard for television advertisements and
another standard for web-based advertisements. While claiming that the
false by necessary implication standard for television applies equally to web-
based advertisements, the court failed to adequately apply or develop this
standard by taking into account the full context of the Internet.7
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Time Warner Cable (TWC) and DIRECTV are fierce competitors in the
multichannel video service industry.8 While both are high-definition (HD)
providers, TWC operates through franchises, whereas DIRECTV provides its
HD service via satellite and is, therefore, not subject to the same franchise
restrictions as TWC.9 This contrast creates a highly volatile and ultra-com-
petitive market, particularly in areas where TWC is franchised.lo
In the fall of 2006, DIRECTV began running advertisements under its
theme of "SOURCE MATTERS."" The brunt of this advertising campaign
was to convey to consumers "that to obtain HD-standard picture quality, it is
not enough to buy an HD television set; consumers must also receive HD
programming from the 'source,' i.e. the television service provider."12 Spe-
cifically, DIRECTV ran three advertisements, each of which TWC claimed
violated the Lanham Act's false advertising provisions.13 The first advertise-
ment, a commercial featuring Jessica Simpson as her character Daisy Duke
from the movie The Dukes of Hazzard, originally aired in October of 2006.14
The commercial ended with the announcer saying, "[fror picture quality that
beats cable, you've got to get DIRECTV."'5 Similarly, the William Shatner
commercial originally aired in October of 2006 and portrayed Shatner in his
popular role as Captain Kirk from the television series Star Trek.16 The
Shatner commercial also ended with the line, "[f]or picture quality that beats
cable, you've got to get DIRECTV."17 In contrast to this familiar tag line,
the Internet advertisements:
7. See id. at 159-61.
8. Id. at 149.
9. Id. at 148-49.
10. Id. at 149.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 149-51.
14. Id. at 149.





[O]pen by showing an image that is so highly pixilated that it is
impossible to discern what is being depicted. On top of this indis-
tinct image is superimposed the slogan, "SOURCE MATTERS."
After about a second, a vertical line splits the screen into two
parts, one labeled "OTHER TV" and the other "DIRECTV." On
the OTHER TV side of the line, the picture is extremely pixilated
and distorted, like the opening image. By contrast, the picture on
the DIRECTV side is exceptionally sharp and clear.' 8
In response to objections and pursuant to an agreement between the par-
ties, DIRECTV pulled the original television commercials and replaced them
with revised commercials.9 Even so, TWC believed the revised commer-
cials still violated the false advertising doctrine and consequently filed a mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction in federal district court.20
III. DESCRIPTION OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
TWC claimed DIRECTV's advertisements violated the false advertising
provision of the Lanham Act because they were literally false and thus dam-
aging and deceptive to consumers. 21 There were two different theories of
recovery upon which TWC could have based its claim: 1) the challenged
advertisement is literally false; or 2) the advertisement, while not literally
false, is likely to mislead or confuse consumers.22 Interestingly, TWC chose
only to pursue a claim under the literally false theory.23 TWC claimed the
advertisements were false on their face, and thus "consumer deception is pre-
sumed and 'the court may grant relief without reference to the advertisements
[actual] impact on the buying public."'24
IV. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE HISTORY
The initial complaint was filed in the Southern District of New York on
December 7, 2006.25 After filing its complaint, TWC entered into negotia-
tions with DIRECTV, and "DIRECTV agreed that pending final resolution of
the action, it would stop running the original versions of the Simpson and
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 151.
21. Id. at 153-54.
22. Id. at 153 (noting that an advertisement that is false on its surface is literally
false and an advertisement that implies a falsehood, which has been proven to
mislead consumers, is the alternative).
23. Id. at 154.
24. Id. at 153 (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317
(2d Cir. 1982)).
25. Id. at 151.
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Shatner commercials and disable the link on the banner advertisements."26
DIRECTV subsequently amended the original commercials so that both en-
ded with the tag line, "[flor an HD picture that can't be beat, get
DIRECTV."27 Following the release of the revised commercials, TWC filed
a motion for preliminary injunction to prohibit DIRECTV from airing its
commercials (including the Internet advertisements).28 The District Court
determined that TWC had met its burden of showing that each of the chal-
lenged advertisements was likely to be proven literally false and granted the
injunction.29 In response, DIRECTV filed the current appeal, arguing the
commercials were not literally false "because no single statement in the com-
mercials explicitly claimed DIRECTV HD is superior to cable HD in terms
of picture quality."30
V. COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING AND RATIONALE
The Second Court of Appeals ultimately held that while the Simpson
and Shatner commercials likely violated the Lanham Act's false advertising
doctrine, the Internet commercials were mere puffery and, therefore, did not
constitute a violation.31 Specifically, the court held that the Simpson com-
mercial made explicit assertions "that it was impossible to obtain 'the best
picture'-i.e., a '1080i'-resolution picture from any source other than
DIRECTV," and that these assertions amounted to literally false statements. 32
Likewise, the court found that the Shatner commercial, while not explicitly
false, nevertheless amounted to a literally false advertisement when viewed
in context. 33 Ultimately, the court adopted the false by necessary implication
doctrine, which requires courts to consider words and images in context
when determining whether an advertisement violates the Lanham Act's false
advertising doctrine.34 The court, however, ruled that the Internet advertise-
ments amounted to puffery because they were so "obviously hyperbolic that
26. Id.
27. Id. at 150.
28. Id. at 151.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 151, 154.
31. Id. at 154.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 158 (noting the assertion "'settling for cable would be illogical,' consid-
ered in light of the advertisement as a whole, unambiguously made the false
claim that cable's HD picture quality is inferior to that of DIRECTV's ...
especially given that in the immediately preceding line, Shatner praises the




'no reasonable buyer would be justified in relying' on it in navigating the
marketplace."35
In adopting the false by necessary implication doctrine, the court rea-
soned that when words and images are viewed in context they may in fact be
literally false.36 That is, "[i]f the words or images, considered in context,
necessarily imply a false message, the advertisement is literally false and no
extrinsic evidence of consumer confusion is required."37 In applying this
principle to the Shatner commercial, the court rejected DIRECTV's argu-
ment that the advertisement's assertion has to be explicit in order for it to
constitute false advertising.38 Instead, the court adopted the false by neces-
sary implication doctrine to clarify how courts should analyze unambiguous
images or words to determine whether they are literally false. 39
However, the court reasoned that the Internet advertisements amounted
to puffery and were not likely to be considered a violation of the Lanham
Act's false advertising doctrine.40 Puffery is defined as:
[A]n exaggeration or overstatement expressed in broad, vague and
commendatory language. Such sales talk, or puffing, as it is com-
monly called, is considered to be offered and understood as an
expression of the seller's opinion only, which is to be discounted
as such by the buyer . . .The puffing rule amounts to a seller's
privilege to lie his head off, so long as he says nothing specific.4'
The court, admittedly, had not often explored the notion of puffery in the
false advertising arena.42 Yet the court attempted to translate this doctrine to
the Internet context by considering the images (rather than the words) of the
advertisement in question.43 In doing so, the court reasoned that the Internet
advertisement was such "an exaggerated, blustering, and boasting statement,
upon which no reasonable buyer would be justified in relying," that it was
likely to amount to puffery and, therefore, the district court erred in ordering
the advertisements removed from the website.44 In particular, the advertise-
ments, which depict an exaggerated distortion of pixels due to the lack of HD






40. Id. at 160.
41. Id. at 159 (quoting Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 945 (3d Cir.
1993)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 159-60.
44. Id. at 160-61 (quoting Pizza Hut, 227 F.3d at 497).
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service provided by DIRECTV, were so over-the-top that no reasonable con-
sumer would consider it anything more than a boastful declaration by an
overzealous company. 45 Moreover, the court noted that "the Internet adver-
tisements simply purport to compare the picture quality of DIRECTV's pro-
gramming to that of basic cable programming."46 Therefore, the court
suggested that because the Internet advertisements were so over-the-top, and
no direct comparison was made to other HD service providers, no reasonable
person could understand those advertisements as more than puffery.47
VI. CRITIQUE OF COURT'S APPROACH
In essence, the court adopted the false by necessary implication doc-
trine, applied it to the television advertisements, and then abandoned its ten-
ets when it analyzed the Internet advertisements.48 The court's inconsistent
approach presents several distinct problems. First, the court appeared to es-
tablish a double standard for television and Internet advertisements by treat-
ing Internet advertisements and television advertisements differently.
Second, the court seemed to abandon its contextual analysis and analytic
framework when it discussed the Internet advertisement. This abandonment
is particularly troubling when one considers that the court spent a good part
of its opinion setting up the false by necessary implication doctrine, but then
failed to consider the context in which Internet advertisements exist.49 Fi-
nally, this case highlights the court's lack of understanding of the growing
importance of Internet advertisements and their increasing prominence in the
world of consumer affairs. As a result, the court may have provided an in-
centive for companies to flood the Internet with false or misleading adver-
tisements simply because the lack of a contextual analysis seems to result in
a more relaxed market where the puffery defense is more readily available.
The court began its analysis of the Internet advertisements by noting
that both parties did not contest that the visual images of the Internet adver-
tisement were literally false.50 The court nevertheless chose not to develop
its false by necessary implication doctrine in the Internet context. Instead,
the court launched into an examination of whether the advertisement
amounted to puffery.51 In doing so, the court relied upon testimony from
TWC, which indicated that the advertisements on the Internet, particularly its
depictions of cable, were "not even remotely realistic."52 The court failed to
45. Id. at 161.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 159-61.
49. See id. at 159-60.
50. Id. at 159.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 161.
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consider the context in which the Internet advertisements were presented, and
it provided no guidance for how to apply the adopted doctrine of false by
necessary implication to an Internet advertisement. Instead, the court left
open the possibility for advertisers to flood the Internet with puffed-up adver-
tisements that effectively dilute the market with hyperbolic ad campaigns.
This result may not seem dire, considering puffery is a valid defense, but
think of the effect if the Internet is flooded with an increase of hyperbolic
advertisements, thereby creating the possibility for an increase in false adver-
tising litigation. As a relatively new medium, the Internet offers opportuni-
ties for a different type of advertising (e.g., banner ads, pop-ups, etc.) and,
therefore, seems to bring about a distinctive need to provide an analytic and
contextual framework upon which courts can analyze these advertisements.
Assuming that the court would attempt to apply the false by necessary
implication doctrine as it would to a television commercial (i.e., by looking
at the message of the advertisement in its entire context), the court provided
no guidance as to what constitutes the proper context. 53 Guidance in this area
seems especially pertinent, considering the Internet is a much more dominant
visual medium than television and is more conducive to fraudulent represen-
tations.54 Throughout its opinion, the Second Circuit argued for a contextual
analysis, but then it failed to consider the entire context involved with In-
ternet advertisements.55 This inconsistent treatment highlights a disparity be-
tween the way in which the court dealt with television advertisements and
Internet-based advertisements, both in terms of understanding the nature of
each medium as well as evaluating the standards under which each medium
is judged in the false advertising arena.
Furthermore, the court quickly brushed aside the opportunity to address
the increasing importance of Internet advertisements and their impact on con-
sumers.56 Despite the introduction of evidence by DIRECTV, "which indi-
cate[d] that consumers are highly confused about HD technology-shows that
the Internet Advertisements pose a real danger to consumer reliance," the
court shuffled past this evidence and moved directly into a discussion of the
puffery defense.57 The concern is not so much with the validity of the evi-
dence, but rather the swiftness with which the court moved past the evidence
with what appeared to be a general reluctance to engage in any discussion
regarding the Internet and the false by necessary implication doctrine.58 Spe-
53. See generally id. at 158 (directing district courts to analyze the message of an
advertisement in full context).
54. See generally Seinfield B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 168 F.3d
967, 969 (7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing the possibility "that the advertising and
promotion of discount prices can be deceptive" to consumers).
55. See Time Warner Cable, 497 F.3d at 144-61.
56. See id. at 159.
57. Id. (italics added for emphasis).
58. See id.
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cifically, the court acknowledged this concern regarding the danger of In-
ternet-based ads, but because "TWC agree[d] that no Lanham Action would
lie against an advertisement that was so exaggerated that no reasonable con-
sumer would rely on it in making his or her purchasing decisions," the court
never reached a discussion regarding the danger these advertisements pose to
consumers.59 Again, this seems indicative of the court's lack of understand-
ing of the role of Internet advertisements in consumer matters and the poten-
tial pitfalls of such advertising.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the ability for companies to hide behind the puffery defense
with regard to Internet advertisements could have some unexpected conse-
quences. First, it may provide an incentive for companies to place unfair
advertisements on the Internet. This may be due, in part, to a lack of under-
standing of the context and analytical framework in which Internet advertise-
ments operate. Second, as Internet advertisements begin to flood the market,
the availability of the puffery defense may provide an additional incentive to
push unfair advertisements toward the Internet based on the belief that the
advertisers may be able to hide behind the puffery veil. Finally, the Internet
is a more dynamic visual medium than television. Therefore, it presents pos-
sibilities for a wider range of false and misleading advertising, which, absent
a clear understanding of the context, may lead to more litigation and further
convolute the viability of promoting fair advertising practices on the Internet.
59. Id.
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